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CHAPTER 4 
Torts 
WILLIAM J. CURRAN 
The survey year was an important one in the law of torts. Consid-
erable activity on the part of the Judicial Council and the various bar 
associations to relieve congestion in the courts - mainly in tort litiga-
tion - resulted initially in the re-enactment of the Fielding Act, plac-
ing in the District Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over automo-
bile tort actions. This activity also gave indication of other possible 
changes in jurisdiction and practice which may vitally affect tort lit-
igation. 
In one significant decision in the tort field the Supreme Judicial 
Court overruled long-standing precedent in two separate areas and in 
another reaffirmed precedent against a trend to the contrary in various 
other jurisdictions. Tort cases during the survey year involved such 
varied topics as groil'S negligence, malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, 
the tort liability of charitable institutions, and the immunity of wit-
nesses in judicial proceedings. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§4.1. Absolute privilege of witnesses in judicial proceedings. The 
concept of absolute privilege, or immunity from liability for damages, 
extended to participants in judicial proceedings is an old but not en-
tirely settled concept in tort law. The open questions today concern 
the peripheral areas, i.e., when does the privilege begin to operate, 
and what is its full extent? 
Both of these problems were before the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Mezullo v. Maletz. 1 There the plaintiff alleged in the second court of 
her declaration that the defendant, a physician, had conducted the 
psychiatric examination and signed the certificate of insanity required 
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by law2 as a prerequisite to the Probate Court's action to commit the 
plaintiff to a mental institution. The plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had made the certification "maliciously and in bad faith" when he 
knew "or should have known" that the plaintiff was sane. 
The Court affirmed the Superior Court's action in sustaining a de-
murrer to the declaration on the ground that the defendant had an 
absolute privilege in making the certification. In so doing the Court 
specifically overruled an earlier decision on the point. In Niven v. 
Boland,3 decided in 1900, the Court had held the privilege to be only a 
qualified one, that is, available only where the physician acts in good 
faith and without malice. 
In its holding in the instant case the Court broke new ground in 
two directions. First, it applied the absolute privilege in a pretrial 
area of the proceedings. There are very few American decisions ex-
tending the privilege to include preliminaries to the tria1.4 The exten-
sion of the privilege in the instant case may indicate a liberality on the 
part of the Massachusetts Court in granting immunity at various pre-
trial stages of the proceedings. 
The second, and perhaps the more important, development evi-
denced in the Mezullo case is the extension of the privilege beyond 
the common area of an immunity from defamation suits into an im-
munity from an action of wrongful commitment. Dean Prosser in his 
treatise on torts discusses the privilege in judicial proceedings only in 
regard to defamation.5 The privilege extended by the Court in the 
Mezullo case was not in regard to a collateral result of the original 
trial, such as defamation, but to an immunity from suit for the direct 
act of aiding in the bringing of the action itself, i.e., a commitment 
proceeding. 
Though the Court in the instant case speaks of an extension of the 
privilege accorded witnesses in regard to defamation, it would seem to 
be more analogous to the privilege of witnesses in malicious prosecu-
tion actions. In malicious prosecution cases, witnesses are afforded 
immunity from suit as long as they do not "advise and assist" the per-
son who brought the proceedings.6 If the Court had analogized the 
case to one in malicious prosecution, the plaintiff would have had to 
allege that the defendant had aided and abetted her husband, who 
had instituted the proceedings. She did not make this allegation in 
the second count. It might be noted, however, that the plaintiff did 
make what amounted to this allegation in the third count, by alleging 
a conspiracy on the part of her husband and the defendant to have 
2 It is not clear whether the commitment was under Section 51 or Section 77 of 
Chapter 123 of the General Laws. For the purposes of the case, the distinctions 
between the procedures under each section are immaterial. 
3177 Mass. 11,58 N.E. 282, 52 L.R.A. 786. 
• Beggs v. McCrea, 62 App. Div. 39, 70 N.Y.S. 864 (1901) (pretrial deposition); 
Reynolds v. McDonald, 174 Mich. 500,160 N.W. 836 (1916); Ried v. Thomas, 99 Cal. 
719, 279 Pac. 226 (1926) (the latter two cases also involve commitment of the men-
tally ill). 
5 Prosser, Torts 821-852 (1941). 
6 leI. at 865. 
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her wrongfully committed. The third count, which is discussed in the 
next section, was predicated solely on a statute making it a criminal 
offense to conspire to wrongfully commit. The Court dismissed this 
count on the independent ground that no cause of action in civil con-
spiracy would lie as a result of the statute. The Court would seem to 
have acted on the assumption, however, that there was an immunity 
existent here as well,7 
To explore the point one step further, if the Court had analogized 
the case to one of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff's case could have 
been dismissed much more summarily. In malicious prosecution the 
criminal proceeding must terminate in the plaintiff's favor. This is 
true because the malicious prosecution action cannot be used as a 
means of collateral attack on the criminal proceedings. In the instant 
case the plaintiff was committed to a mental institution in the first 
proceeding and so the Court could have dismissed the action on that 
ground. 
§4.2. Civil conspiracy. One of the least explored areas of tort lia-
bility is conspiracy. It has had its fullest development in the criminal 
law. The subject of civil conspiracy receives only one paragraph of 
sparse attention in Dean Prosser's classic treatise on torts.! 
In Mezullo v. Maletz,2 discussed above, the plaintiff alleged in the 
third count of her declaration a conspiracy on the part of her hus-
band and the defendant, a physician, to have the plaintiff wrongfully 
committed to a mental institution. Chapter 123, Section 79 of the 
General Laws makes such a conspiracy a crime. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in a split decision3 affirmed the action 
of the lower court in sustaining a demurrer to this count. The Court 
asserted that civil liability could not be created by the enactment of a 
criminal statute without a clear indication of such a purpose on the 
part of the legislature. None being found here, the Court dismissed 
the count. In so holding the Court specifically rejected the dictum to 
the contrary on this statute as expressed in Karjavainen v. Buswelf.4 
In refusing to follow the dictum in the Karjavainen case the Court 
would also seem to have qualified the language of a line of labor law 
cases,5 not mentioned in the decision, and best exemplified by the lan-
guage of Carew v. Rutherford: 
. . . if two or more persons combine to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose, or a purpose not unlawful by unlawful means, their con-
• "The statute ... fills what otherwise would be a gap, at least with respect to 
those statutes dealing with commitment proceedings, by providing a penalty for 
conspiracy to engage in conduct which is exempt from civil liability." 1954 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 259, 264, 118 N.E.2d 356, 360. 
§4.2. 1 Prosser, Torts 1095, 1096 (1941). 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 259, 118 N.E.2d 356. 
3 The Court indicated in the last sentence of the opinion that the decision on the 
third count was the "opinion of a majority of the court." 
4289 Mass. 419,194 N.E. 295 (1935). 
5 A few of the better known cases are as follows: Vegelahn v. Gllntner, 167 Mass. 
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duct comes within the definition of a criminal conspiracy . If, 
in pursuance of such a conspiracy, they do an act injurious to any 
person, he may have an action against them to recover the dam-
age they have done to him.6 
Examination of the American decisions on the law of conspiracy 
does not reveal any difference in the essential characteristics of the 
crime and the tort. They are both defined as set out above in the 
Carew case.7 If this is the definition, it is difficult to see why it was 
not satisfied in the Mezullo case. The purpose of the alleged conspir-
acy was certainly unlawful, in fact, the entire conspiracy was defined 
as criminal. 
Should the law of conspiracy, therefore, be an exception to the 
usual Massachusetts rule that no new causes of action are created by 
criminal statutes? If, as the instant case seems to hold, there is a dif-
ference between criminal and civil conpiracy, it would have been 
helpful in future cases if the Court had pointed out those distinctions 
more clearly. 
Because of the way in which the Court treated the Mezullo case it 
did not discuss the possibility of there being a common law civil con-
spiracy on the facts alleged.s The Court's discussion of the issues does 
indicate, however, that it assumes that the defendant has an absolute 
immunity from common law liability.9 The Court would seem to have 
relied on the finding on the second count of the declaration to the ef-
fect that there is an immunity. Yet the second count did not contain 
an allegation that the defendant aided and abetted, i.e., conspired, to 
bring the proceedings to commit. Where the defendant does aid and 
abet, it would seem that the immunity is not available.10 
The decision in the Mezullo case, that of a rarely divided courf, il-
lustrates the difficulties of dealing with civil conspiracy, one of the 
most elusive concepts in American tort law today. 
§4.3. Tort liability and criminal statutes: A problem of interpreta-
tion. The majority of American states hold that the establishment 
of criminal liability for a particular action necessarily creates civil lia-
bility as well.1 The Mezullo case, however, is an illustration of the ap-
plication in Massachusetts of the minority rule that the court will ex-
92,44 N.E. 1077 (1896); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011. (1900); Sweet-
man v. Barrow, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N.E. 272 (1928); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 
76 N.E.2d 12 (1947). 
• 106 Mass. 1, 10 (1870). 
7 Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 242 (1954); Charlesworth, Con-
spiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 L.Q. Rev. 38 (1920); Burdick, Conspiracy 
as a Crime and as a Tort, 7 Col. L. Rev. 229 (1907). 
8 "The plaintiff does not contend that a case at common law is made out by the 
allegations of the third count; she relies exclusively on the statute. But that, as we 
have seen, gives her no rights." 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 259, 265, 118 N.E.2d 356, 360. 
• See the language of the opinion quoted in Section 4.1 supra, note 7. 
10 See Section 4.1 supra, note 6. 
§4.3. 1 ProsSer, Torts 274 (1941); 2 Restatement, Torts §286 (1934). 
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amine the criminal statute to ascertain whether or not the legislature 
in the particular instance intended to establish civil liability. 
The minority position seems well reasoned, since it forces the courts 
to look beyond the mere fact of the criminal statute to examine the 
purposes and effects of the criminal legislation on the field of civil lia-
bility. Certainly this examination cannot be harmful and it may pre-
vent an unjust and unintended extension of legislative purposes. 
However, though the minority would seem to be following the bet-
ter rule, it may often result in a process just as mechanical as that 
necessitated by the majority rule. The Massachusetts Court requires 
that the purpose to create civil liability appear by "express terms or 
clear implication" 2 in the enactment of the criminal statute. Since 
there is very little in this state in the way of legislative history mate-
rials, a heavy burden is placed on a party where the criminal statute 
does not expressly provide a civil remedy. 
Another point might be noted in regard to the application of this 
minority rule in the Mezullo case. The doctrine has generally been 
limited to negligence cases involving nonfeasance. It is often stated as 
a "no duty" rule,S i.e., where there is no duty to act at common law, 
the criminal statute must clearly assert the establishment of this duty. 
The Mezullo case, on the other hand, involves intentional misconduct 
or malfeasance, there being alleged a conspiracy to falsely commit the 
plaintiff to a mental institution. The Mezullo case is therefore an as-
sertion by the Court that this doctrine is not limited to " no duty" situ-
ations. 
In summary, it would seem that in the instant case the Court was 
influenced by a desire to afford physicians complete immunity from 
civil liability in a cettification of commitment papers, the certification 
being an act in their professional capacity and in aid of the courts. 
The Court may have felt that the doctor should not be hampered by 
the fear of civil liability, particularly in commitment of the mentally 
ill, where perhaps more than in most other areas the physician may 
need protection from possible harassment and baseless claims. The 
Court seems to have felt that this protective policy extends to conspir-
acy actions, and finding no evidence in the criminal statute to abro-
gate it, applied it in this case. 
Certainly the action of the Court in this case can be defended in the 
justice of its result as well as in its theory. The freedom of action to 
apply policy decisions of this type is perhaps one of the best features 
of the minority rule that criminal statutes do not always create civil 
liability. It leaves us, however, with the anomalous situation, in this 
case, of a defendant immune from civil liability but subject to criminal 
penalty for exactly the same action. 
• Mezullo v. Maletz, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 259, 264, 118 N.E.2d 356, 359. See also 
Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10,40 N.E.2d 10 (1942); Richmond v. Warren Institution 
for Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 30 N.E.2d 40 (1940); Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 3 
N.E.2d 236 (1936). 
• Morris, Treatise on Torts 157 et seq. (1953). 
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§4.4. Malicious prosecution: Probable cause. One of the most 
difficult concepts in the action of malicious prosecution is the require-
ment of a want of probable cause for the defendant to believe the 
plaintiff guilty of the offense charged. 
In Willis v. Gurry! the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with 
the question of whether a finding of "probable cause" by a District 
Court judge to hold the person charged for grand jury action fore-
closes the issue of probable cause in a later malicious prosecution 
action. The Court held that .the District Court's finding was only 
evidence of probable cause and affirmed the trial court's action in 
sending the case to the jury over the defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict.2 
The ruling of the Court seems in accord with the other American 
decisions on the point, though some other states give the judge's find-
ing a stronger effect by making it prima facie evidence of probable 
cause.3 
In support of its holding in the Willis case the Court cited Keefe v. 
johnson,4 the only other Massachusetts decision clearly on the point. 
The Court cited language in the Keefe case to the effect that the is-
suance of a criminal complaint by a District Court judge is "at least 
evidence to be considered on probable cause." 5 
The Keefe case did, however, raise the question of whether or not 
this action of the District Court judge should foreclose the issue in fa-
vor of the existence of probable cause just as does action on the advice 
of counsel.6 The Court in the Keefe case would seem to have leaned 
toward such a conclusion and toward holding probable cause estab-
lished on the basis of the finding of the judge, but the Court found it 
unnecessary to go that far, since an auditor had found probable cause 
to exist on the facts. It therefore made the finding quoted, that the 
judge's finding was "at least evidence to be considered on probable 
cause." (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Judicial Court in the 
Willis case, however, seized on the actual finding in the Keefe case and 
put at rest any speculation that the Court might hold such a finding of 
a District Court judge to "establish" probable cause. 
The Willis case raises fundamental issues in regard to this require-
ment of probable cause - mainly in terms of who decides the issue, 
judge or jury. The American decisions on this point indicate a policy 
§4.4. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 21, 116 N.E.2d 689. 
2 The defendant conceded in his brief that there was sufficient evidence of lack 
of probable cause in the case to sustain the burden of proof and prevent a directed 
verdict. The Court asserted that this was concession enough to dispose of the case, 
but it went on to make the findings here discussed. 
• 3 Restatement, Torts §§663, 664 (1934); Green, Judge and Jury 346 (1930). 
• 304 Mass. 572, 24 N.E.2d 520 (1939). 
• 304 Mass. at 579, 24 N.E.2d at 524. 
• Action on the advice of counsel is universally recognized as "establishing" prob· 
able cause. Prosser, Torts 873-875 (1941); 3 Restatement, Torts §666 (1934). In 
Massachusetts, see Higgins v. Pratt, 316 Mass. 700, 56 N.E.2d 595 (1944); Boylen v. 
Tracy, 254 Mass. 105, 149 N.E. 669 (1925). 
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of retaining control of this issue in the judge.7 Massachusetts deci-
sions have indicated accord with this policy, at least in part,S but the 
Willis and Keefe cases show a disposition to allow juries to decide the 
ultimate issue. 
§4.5. Tort liability of charities. It is not often that a review of 
significant decisions over a period of one year will include a rescript 
without opinion. However, that is the situation this survey year, 
since in a rescript the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its long-
standing rule of complete civil immunity for charitable organizations. 
The decision was Mastrangelo v. Maverick} an action against a hospi-
tal for negligence in the death of a patient. 
The decision is significant in that it goes against a well-developed 
trend in recent years all over the country toward lifting this immunity 
in whole or in part.2 Today only ten jurisdictions retain the rule of 
absolute immunity.3 
The doctrine of charitable immunity was introduced into the 
United States in a Massachusetts decision in 1876, McDonald v. Massa-
chusetts General Hospitaf.4 In that case the Court followed an Eng-
lish decision which, apparently unknown to the Massachusetts judges, 
had been overruled ten years before.5 Despite this questionable be-
ginning, the doctrine spread in the United States and it is only in re-
cent times that most of the American states have definitely swung away 
from the Massachusetts rule. 
The Mastrangelo case not only indicates that the rule is still quite 
vigorously alive in Massachusetts, but the cursory treatment by re-
script only one week after argument certainly indicates no inclination 
to change. It is now thirty-four years since the Court has engaged in 
a full discussion of the issue in its decisions.6 Any treatment of the 
problem in the interim has been directed toward a determination of 
the exact boundaries of the rule. Thus, immunity was denied to a 
charitable institution where the liability arose in regard to a part of 
the charity's property leased to a private tenant,7 and was also denied 
• Green, Judge and Jury 341 et seq. (1930). 
8 See Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572, 577, 24 N.E.2d 520, 523 (1939): "It has been 
said repeatedly that when the facts are fully established or undisputed, probable 
cause becomes a question of law." See also Bannon v. Auger, 262 Mass. 427, 160 N.E. 
255 (1928); Griffin v. Dearborn, 210 Mass. 308, 96 N.E. 681 (1912); Casavan v. Sage, 
201 Mass. 547, 87 N.E. 893 (1909). 
§4.5. 1330 Mass. 708, 115 N.E.2d 455 (1953). 
2 See particularly an excellent and well-documented annotation in 25 A.L.R.2d 29 
(1952). 
3 Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. 
• 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529. 
5 Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192 (1862); overruled in Mersey Dock's 
Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686 (1866). 
• Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A.L.R. 563 
(1920). 
7 Holder v. Massachusetts Horticultural Society, 211 Mass. 370, 97 N.E. 630 (1912). 
7
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where a charity was engaged in business for profit.8 Immunity has 
been applied whether the plaintiff was a beneficiary of the trust,9 a 
paying patient,lO or a stranger.n The Court has also rejected the con-
tention, accepted by some other states,12 that the plaintiff should be 
able to reach any liability insurance held by the charity where it cov-
ers the matter involved.13 In the only decision indicating any weakness 
in this wall of immunity the Court did not allow a hospital to set up 
immunity as a defense to a counterclaim for negligence in treatment 
where the hospital was suing a patient on an unpaid bill for that treat-
ment,!4 
The Mastrangelo case is, therefore, of importance mainly in indi-
cating that the doctrine of absolute immunity of charitable organiza-
tions is still quite settled law in Massachusetts despite a definite trend 
to the contrary throughout the United States. Those who would seek 
a change in this doctrine in the future would seem better directed to 
the legislature, where changes of this magnitude may perhaps best be 
treated. 
§4.6. Gross negligence and the guest occupant of an automobile: 
An evaluation. Negligence is a difficult enough concept without con-
founding it with degrees of negligence. The courts have determined 
to use degrees of negligence in only a minority of jurisdictions'! They 
seem to be a favorite of some legislatures, however, to the discomfort 
of the courts forced to apply them.2 
The concept of degrees of negligence - slight, ordinary, and gross 
- was first introduced in regard to bailments,3 but it has spread to 
other areas. One of the most common applications is in regard to 
guest (nonpaying) occupants of automobiles in cases where it is said 
that the operator is responsible to the guest only for gross negligence 
or worse.4 Some recent law review articles have been severely critical 
of the trials and mistrials of the courts in attempting to deal with the 
8 McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-operative Industries and Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 
172 N.E. 68 (1930). 
• McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 
(1876). 
10 Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A.L.R. 
563 (1920). 
11 Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923). 
12 Slenker v. Gordon, 344 Ill. App. I, 100 N.E.2d 354 (1951); O'Connor v. Boulder, 
Colorado Sanitarium Assn., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939); McLeod v. St. Thomas 
Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936). 
13 Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170.N.E. 43 (1930). 
,. Beverly Hospital v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N.E. 641, 100 A.L.R. 1338 (1935). 
§4.6. 1 Prosser, Torts 258 (1941). 
2 See, for example, Sorrel v. White, 103 Vt. 277, 153 Atl. 359 (1931). 
3 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1704); Actman v. Aronson, 
231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 4 A.L.R. 1185 (1913); 1 Street, Foundations of Legal 
Liability 100 (1906). The doctrine has been repudiated as to bailments in England. 
Grill & General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600 (1866). 
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concept.5 Most of the authors conclude that the doctrine is of lim-
ited utility, confusing to the jury, and productive of litigation, particu-
larly in appeals to the higher courts. 
The doctrine is, however, firmly entrenched in Massachusetts. It 
has been the source of a large number of appellate decisions testing 
the sufficiency of the evidence and the correctness of the trial court's 
decision either in directing a verdict for the defendant or in allowing 
a jury verdict for the plaintiff to stand. 
Most of the decisions turn on the particular facts involved and 
the Court constantly reasserts that each case is tested independently. 
However, this now very long line of decisions involving as it does one 
type of activitYi the operation of a motor vehicle, has built up a large 
body of law in the field. 
There were before the Supreme Judicial Court during the survey 
year three cases of significance on the issue of gross negligence in the 
operation of a motor vehicle. 
The first was Reynolds v. Sullivan,6 which involved an assumption 
of the risk of negligence on the part of the guest occupant. The 
Court clearly differentiated this issue from that of gross negligence and 
placed the burden of proof of assumption of the risk on the defendant. 
The defendant should not be aided in this effort by the fact that the 
plaintiff must prove gross negligence on the defendant's part. 
The other two decisions, Welts v. Caldwell 7 and Vallas v. Carzis,8 
illustrate the practice of the Massachusetts Court in using other cases 
and fact situations in determining which way the instant case should 
be decided. 
In Welts v. Caldwell the evidence examined in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff revealed that the defendant had allowed two boys, 
one of them the fourteen-year-old plaintiff, to ride on the rear bumper 
of his car down a driveway and into the street. As the car passed into 
the street it went over a bump, accelerated, and turned left. The 
plaintiff was thrown off into the street and injured. 
The lower court held the plaintiff a guest occupant and allowed the 
case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision as error in not granting 
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
• Comment, Paradox of the Colorado Guest Statute, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 68 
(1952); Richards, Another Decade Under the Guest Statute, 24 Wash. L. Rev. WI 
(1949); Morris, The Guest Statute Today, 22 Ohio Bar 224 (1949); Morlay, Liability 
Under the Automobile Guest Statute, I Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947); Georgetta, Major Issues 
in a Guest Case, [1954] Ins. L.J. 583; The Arkansas Guest Statute, I Ark. L. Rev. 
50 (1946); Wilkinson, What Has Happened to the Colorado Guest Statute, 19 Rocky 
Mt. L. Rev. 91 (1946); Spikes, Gross Negligence Under the Guest Statute, 22 Neb. 
L. Rev. 264 (1943). The reader might also see the yearly discussion of the more 
significant cases in this area in the article on torts in the Annual Survey of American 
Law. 
• 330 Mass. 549, 116 N.E.2d 128 (1953). 
71954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 567,120 N.E.2d 280. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 535, 120 N.E.2d 294. 
9
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The Court in arriving at this conclusion asserted 9 that the case fell 
"within the class of cases illustrated by" four caseslO which were cited, 
though not discussed. 
In the second case, Vallas v. Carzis, the defendant was driving about 
forty or fifty miles per hour down a residential street in Cohasset, Mas-
sachusetts, about 2:00 A.M., when his attention was called to a friend 
walking on the sidewalk nearby. The defendant took his right hand 
from the wheel, reached across the plaintiff, a guest occupant in the 
front seat of the car, and waved his hand out the right front window, 
and said, "Hi, Herb." The defendant had been in this position for 
six or seven seconds when the car left the road and struck a tree. 
The trial court sent the case to the jury on the issue of gross negli-
gence and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. The Supreme J u-
dicial Court affirmed. In this opinion the Court did not cite a "class" 
of cases into which this decision fell. 
The two cases above discussed do, however, seem to fit into distinct 
groups of fact situations with which the Supreme Judicial Court has 
dealt in recent years.u The Wells case seems to be part of a class of 
cases involving guests riding on bumpers or running boards of auto-
mobiles, or in other insecure positions. The question of liability in 
these decisions seems to turn on such factors as the securi ty of the po-
sition taken by the guest, the speed of the vehicle, and any sudden 
stops or turns taken by the driver.12 
The Vallas case also seems easily classified with other cases of delib-
erate inattention to driving, involving as it does the defendant's tak-
ing his eyes off the road or his hands off the wheel. In these cases 
the issue seems to turn on the speed of the car, the road conditions, 
and the length of time of the inattention or lack of control over the 
vehicle.13 The decisions in this group seem more apt to go to a jury 
on the question of gross negligence. 
In conclusion, it might be said that the wealth of decisions in this 
field rather forces the development of patterns of conduct definable as 
clearly not gross negligence or as warranting a verdict of gross negli-
gence. Whether or not these patterns are sufficiently developed to be 
utilized to any great extent by the courts is, however, another ques-
tion. The Welts case would seem to be an indication of the Court's 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 567, 568-569, 120 N.E.2d 280,281. 
10 Forman v. Prevoir, 266 Mass. Ill, 164 N.E. 818 (1929); Byrne v. Daley, 288 Mass. 
51, 192 N.E. 201 (1935); PoIcari v. Cardello, 316 Mass. 421, 55 N.E.2d 681 (1944); 
Thomas v. Fritz, 318 Mass. 622, 63 N.E.2d 357 (1945). 
11 See Martin and Hennessey, Automobile Law and Practice §§391-420 (1954), which 
agrees with the attempted classification of automobile guest gross negligence cases 
as herein suggested. The instant cases are not discussed, of course, since the book 
was already in print when they were decided. Two of the classes of cases suggested 
by the authors are (I) removing hands from steering wheel (§399), and (2) guest on 
running board or in another insecure position (§§411, 412). The same thesis is pro-
posed in Allen, A Classification of the Automobile Guest Cases, 32 B.U.L. Rev. 162 
(1952). 
12 See Martin and Hennessey, id. §§41l, 412, and cases there cited; Allen, id. at 177. 
13 See Martin and Hennessey, id. §399, and cases there cited; Allen, id. at 172. 
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willingness to examine the patterns and to fit the instant case into 
them. The Vallas case, on the other hand, does not conform to this 
tendency. 
It may well be that appellate advocacy has a great deal to do with 
whether or not the Court uses this method of dealing with these cases. 
If the attorneys do not argue in terms of "patterns" of cases, it is un-
derstandable that the Court does not do it. There undoubtedly will 
be many more of these cases. They will bear watching in this regard 
in future issues of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§4.7. Re-enactment of the Fielding Act. A concerted effort on the 
part of the Judicial Council l and the state's two largest bar associ a-
tions2 to present statutory remedies for the relief of congestion in the 
Superior Court has resulted in the support by these organizations of a 
number of procedural bills, among them bills to establish a jury fee of 
$15,3 to re-enact the Fielding Act,4 to establish a procedure for pretrial 
depositions,5 and to make a change in the venue provisions of the 
D;strict Courts.6 
Only the bill to re-enact the Fielding Act was passed at the 1954 ses-
sion of the General Court.7 Under this legislation the District Courts 
will again, as they did from 1934 to 1943, have exclusive original juris-
diction of all tort cases arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. 
As under the previous legislation, either party may, after the case is 
entered in the District Court, remove it to the Superior Court for trial. 
It was this easy removal procedure which resulted in the repeal of 
the Fielding Act in 1943. The advocates of re-enactment8 were well 
aware of this, but they felt that the legislation still kept a significant 
number of cases in the District Court which might otherwise have been 
entered in the Superior Court. 
For a more extensive examination of these efforts toward reform in 
judicial administration, see Section 27.5 infra. 
§4.8. Proposal for comparative negligence. Bills defeated in the 
legislature are often as important in indicating trends in the law as 
bills that pass. This is particularly true if the defeated bills embody 
principles which have gained favor in other areas in recent years. 
§4.7. 1 Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massa· 
chusetts 6 (1953). 
2 Congestion in the Superior Court, Executive Committee Report, 38 Mass. L.Q., 
No.5, p. 5 (1953); Report of the Special Committee on Court Congestion, 25 Boston 
Bar Bull. 219 (1954). 
3 House No. 2631 (1954). 
• House No. 2629 (1954). 
5 Ibid. 
• House No. 2630 (1954). 
7 Acts of 1954, c. 616. 
8 Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 
6 (1953). 
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The defeat of a proposal! for the adoption of the comparative negli-
gence doctrine in Massachusetts is therefore worthy of note. Various 
authors assert that it is the "coming rule" of liability for negligence in 
the United States.2 It is pointed out that Great Britain and nearly all 
of the members of the British Commonwealth have abandoned the se-
vere doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete defense in neg-
ligence actions.s Comparative negligence has always been the rule of 
the civillaw.4 This leaves the United States as the lone bulwark of the 
contributory negligence rule. 
Actually, the United States has already begun to break away from 
the doctrine. Five states have now adopted the comparative negli-
gence test in some form.5 The comparative negligence test is also ap-
plied in admiralty law,6 under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,7 
and under several state employers' liability acts.s 
In the face of this development, numerous bills have been intro-
duced before the state legislatures throughout the country in recent 
years to bring about the change to a comparative negligence test. 
These bills have not met with success, either in Massachusetts or in 
the other states where they have been entered. 
The most recent efforts in Massachusetts might not warrant more 
than passing attention were it not for the outstanding legal authorities 
who proposed and advocated the measure. One of the sponsors of the 
bill was Roscoe Pound, Dean Emeritus of the Harvard Law School, in 
his capacity as Editor in Chief of the NACCA Law Journal. One of 
those who spoke in favor of the bill at the committee hearing was Pro-
fessor Warren Seavey of the Harvard Law School, one of the country's 
greatest tort law authorities. 
The bill submitted in 1954 has an interesting genesis. It was taken 
verbatim from a suggested draft for such a statute in a law review arti-
cle9 by Dean William L. Prosser of the University of California School 
of Law. The NACCA organization has chosen to recommend the 
§4.8. 1 House No. 1669 (1954). 
2 Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 Nacca L.J. 195 (1954); James, Contributory 
Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691, 704 (1953); Musser, Answer for Kansas - Comparative 
Negligence, 21 J.B.A. Kan. 232 (1953); Duniway, California Should Adopt a Com-
parative Negligence Law, 28 Calif. S.B.J. 23 (1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence 
on the March, 28 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 189 (1950). 
3 Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Ceo. VI, c. 28. See Williams, The Law Reform 
Act, 1945,9 Mod. L. Rev. 105 (1945). 
• For a recent examination, with an excellent historical treatment, see Turk, Com-
parative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 189, 238, 244 (1950). 
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1151 (1943); Laws of South Dakota, c. 160 (1943); Ca. Code 
Ann. §105-603 (1947); Miss. Code §1454 (1910); Wis. Stat. §331.045 (1931). 
• The Schooner Catherine, 17 How. 170 (1855); see Derby, Divided Damages in 
Maritime Cases, 33 Va. L. Rev. 389 (1947). 
• 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1946). 
8 See references to these statntes, too numerous and varied to be noted here, in 
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 478, 479 (1953). 
• Id. at 508. 
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draft as a legislative proposal on the part of its members in the various 
states not now applying the comparative negligence test.1O 
The opposition to the comparative negligence rule is directed as 
much to the difficulties in its administration as to its substance. The 
difficulties lie in the application of the rule to particular cases. Basi-
cally, the American statutes in the field have chosen either a percent-
age apportionment test or a "degrees of negligence" test (i.e., slight 
and gross negligence are compared). The Prosser draft introduced 
in Massachusetts adopts the apportionment test. 
The difficulties in application of either of these theories is illus-
trated by the fact that the two main proponents of the bill, Dean 
Pound and Professor Seavey, offered tests different from the bill and 
different from one another's proposals. 
Dean Pound asserted the proper test to be not a percentage of liabil-
ity based on causation (the test in the bill), but a liability based on an 
evaluation of which person's conduct is the greater threat to the 
general security.ll Professor Seavey rejected the test in the bill and as-
serted that he favored the American admiralty law rule under which 
the total damages are divided evenly where both are negligent. 
Opponents of the bill cited the difficulties in administration of the 
test and offered the usual objections that the proposal would amount 
to a "universal recovery" in negligence cases, would increase litigation, 
and would cause a substantial rise in liability insurance rates. 
Judging from the results on the 1954 bill and similar bills in recent 
years, any proposal for a comparative negligence test in Massachusetts 
faces an uphill fight in the immediate future unless greater general 
public interest and support can be generated in its favor. 
§4.9. The right of privacy. Another defeated bill worthy of con-
sideration in this year's SURVEY is the bill sponsored by the Judicial 
Council! to clarify the law of Massachusetts in regard to the so-called 
"right of privacy." 
The decisions on this point, as the Judicial Council aptly observes,2 
leave entirely open the question of whether or not the Massachu-
setts Court would recognize the existence of the right in a proper case.3 
By the Resolves of 1953, Chapter 23, the Judicial Council had re-
ferred to it a bill to establish such a right in this state.4 The bill was 
10 13 NACCA L.J. 301, 302 (1954). 
11 Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 198 (1954). 
§4.9. 1 Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massa-
chusetts 23-27 (1953). See also Bulletin of Committee Work and Business of the 
Legislature 88 (final ed. 1954), where the bill here discussed is noted, though not 
by number, and is listed as defeated on March 12, 1954 on the report "No legisla-
tion necessary." 
2 Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 
24 (1953). 
3 See Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 277, 98 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1951); 
Themo v. New England Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940). 
• House No. 1370, §2 (1953). 
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modeled on the present New York statute on the right of privacy.5 
The Council rejected this proposal as not covering the subject mat-
ter of the right sufficiently and as productive of litigation. The Coun-
cil offered in its place an amendment6 to the general equity jurisdic-
tion statute,7 extending that jurisdiction to include "the protection, 
with or without damages, of the equitable interest in personality some-
times called 'the right of privacy' of a person against unreasonable 
and serious interference with such person's interest in not having his 
affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public." 
The Council based the draft of the bill on the Restatement of Torts 
provision on the subject,S but applied it to equity jurisdiction rather 
than tort law. In so doing, the Council seems to have been convinced 
that it was too difficult to draw a statute codifying the tort law princi-
ples in this area of personal rights. It therefore hit upon the solution 
of creating a "purely equitable right" 9 of privacy defined as set out 
above, but including the power in the equity court to "protect" this 
right "with or without damages." 
It would seem that if the statute had passed it would have at least 
"established" in Massachusetts a right of privacy in rather broad terms. 
Whether the form of establishment selected would have caused less or 
more difficulties in drawing the area lines of the right than the same 
statute enacted as tort law is certainly speculative. The proposal 
would still have to be interpreted by the courts. A statute restricting 
the court's powers to an equity jurisdiction might cause much greater 
difficulty than a statute merely declaring the existence of the right and 
allowing the courts to determine the best remedies to enforce it. 
The practice of adding specific areas of equity jurisdiction to the 
general equity jurisdiction statute seems unwise in any event, since the 
Massachusetts statute was enacted after a long and troubled history of 
limited equity jurisdiction.10 The statute was intended to declare the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Superior Court possessed of 
complete equity jurisdiction and thereby to end the General Court's 
practice of passing statute after statute giving the courts equity juris-
diction in certain specific areas. 
The defeat of the proposal of the Judicial Council leaves us with the 
still unresolved question of whether the Massachusetts courts will rec-
ognize a "right of privacy" which is subject to "protection" and for 
the violation of which compensation can be demanded. We can only 
assume that the legislature indicated a purpose to leave the question to 
the courts for determination. 
5 New York Civil Rights Law §§50, 51 (1930). 
• The amendment would have added a new section, Section lA, to Chapter 214 of 
the General Laws. 
7 G.L., c. 214, §l. 
84 Restatement, Torts §867 (1934). 
• Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 
26 (1953). 
10 Curran, The Struggle for Equity Jurisdiction in Massachusetts, 31 B.U.L. Rev. 
269 (1951). 
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